With the growing Cyber threats, the need to develop high assurance Cyber systems is becoming increasingly important. The objective of this paper is to address the challenges of modeling and detecting sophisticated and diversified network attacks. Using one of the important statistical machine learning (ML) techniques, Hidden Markov Models (HMM), we develop two architectures that can detect and track in real-time the progress of these organized attacks. These architectures are based on developing a database of HMM templates and exhibit varying performance and complexity. For performance evaluation, in the presence of multiple multi-stage attack scenarios, various metrics are proposed which include (1) attack risk probability, (2) detection error rate, and (3) the number of correctly detected stages. Extensive simulation experiments are used based on the DARPA2000 dataset to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed architectures.
knowledge. Due to increased computational complexity in detecting real time attacks, these techniques pose a limitation.
In the category of ML technique, HMM is a leading approach in intrusion detection and prediction of multi-stages attacks [22] - [31] . In this approach, stages of an attack are modeled as states of the HMM. The existing HMM based detection systems, however, are primarily focused on single multi-stage attacks. HMM is considered the most suitable detection techniques for such attacks for several reasons [22] . First, it has a tractable mathematical formalism in terms of analyzing input-output relationships, and generating transition probability matrices based on training dataset. Second, because it is specialized to deal with sequential data by exploiting transition probability between states, it can track the progress of a multi-stage attack.
Existing approaches address only a single multi-stage attack. The problem of detecting multiple interleaved multi-stage attacks has not been addressed in the literature. Several challenges are faced for detecting interleaved attacks which include: (1) how to model each multi-stage attack in terms of HMM states in the presence of mixed observations, (2) how to detect a multi-stage attack when an attacker(s) performs interleaved attacks with the intention to hide an attack, (3) since there is no standard public dataset available that provides interleaved traffic from simultaneous multiple attacks, generating this type of datasets poses a challenge, (4) design an efficient architecture that detects and tracks the progress of multiple simultaneous attacks, and (5) how to accurately quantify and measure the detection performance of such an architecture.
To address the above challenges, in this paper, we propose two architectures based on HMM formalism. The proposed architectures exhibit varying detection performance and processing complexities. The architectures can detect the occurrence of multiple organized attacks and provide insights about the dynamics of these attacks such as identifying which attack is progressing and which one is idle at any point of time; how fast or slow each attack is progressing; and in which security state each attack is in at a certain time. Knowledge of these insights can assist in designing effective response mechanisms that can mitigate security risk to the network [1] , [32] . The design of the first proposed architecture relies on modifying HMM model parameters to detect multiple multi-stage attacks in the presence of mixed alerts. While on the other hand, the second proposed architecture relies on de-interleaving mixed alerts from different attacks prior to the HMM processing subsystem. We compare the two architectures in terms of their detection performance and design complexity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce the system model in Section II. We present the proposed architectures in Section III and evaluation and performance measures in Section IV. We conclude the paper in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ARCHITECTURE
In order to detect multiple multi-stage attacks, say K attacks, one can generalize the existing single attack architecture by building a database of K HMM templates. In Fig. 1 , we present a generic architecture for the threat detection process that uses such a database. Here, each HMM-based template, is designed to detect a specific type of multi-stage attack. The goal of this architecture is to detect K multi-step attacks originated from a single or multiple attackers.
Note, each of the K HMM templates is trained for detecting an individual multi-step attack.
Each template encompasses the HMM structure including the transition probability matrix and a number of states [33] .
The second major component of this architecture is the intrusion detection system (IDS), (e.g., SNORT software [34] , [35] ), which generates the attack related alerts in real time from the network traffic according to a predefined set of rules. Typically, an IDS generates a stream of alerts which are temporally ordered based on their timestamps. The online processing of this stream of alerts can potentially require a large amount of memory [36] . The selection of IDS rules can help in reducing the large volume of alerts, as well as can reduce false positives. The interleaved alerts generated by SNORT can belong to one or multiple attacks. These alerts can be preprocessed to generate observations in a suitable format that can be forwarded to the HMM database. Based on the information from SNORT, preprocessing module can assign different severity levels for the incoming alerts. The higher the level is, the more severe the alert is, which indicates that an ongoing multi-stage attack is progressing towards an advanced stage.
In this paper, the incoming alerts to the system are grouped to form an observation sequence of length T . Note, the risk of progressing multi-stage attacks can be assessed in real time by the risk assessment component and prioritized response actions can be taken based on detected states and the risk of the active attacks [1] .
In the following, we present a preliminary discussion about HMM formalism and subsequently,
in Section III, we use this model to build the proposed architectures.
A. Hidden Markov Model Description
An HMM is a doubly stochastic process [33] with an underlying stochastic process that is hidden, and can only be observed through another set of stochastic processes that produce the sequence of observed symbols. The observation process corresponds to alerts generated by the IDS. In this section, we provide mathematical preliminaries for the discrete HMM in the context of multiple multi-stage attacks. Consider that each attack is modeled using a distinct HMM model λ k that encompasses all the following parameters,
where S k = {s 1 k , . . . , s n k , . . . , s N k }, s n k represents State n of Attack k, and N k is the number of states in Attack k. Note, for multiple attacks, different attacks can have different values of N . In this paper, for simplicity of HMM computations, we assume that ongoing multistage attacks in the network can be modeled with the same number of security states.
the total number of distinct observations for Attack k. In our model, we consider both the cases of V i ∩ V j = φ and V i ∩ V j = φ, for j = i, and j, i = 1, 2, . . . , K. That is, any two multistage attacks can have the same set of observations. A k represents the state transition probability matrix of Attack k with dimension N k × N k . Each element in this matrix, a ij , represents the state transition probability form state i to state j as follows:
B k is the observation emission probability matrix with dimension N k × M k . The emission probability of the m th observation of state j is represented by b j (m), as follows:
Initial probability distribution vector (π) represents initial states probabilities of the HMM states [33] . The other type of HMM is the left-right HMM which has the property that as the time progresses, the state number increases, i.e., state transition proceeds from left to right and there is no return transition. This type of modeling puts a constraint on the state probability matrix such that:
The left-right HMM model is suitable for the type of applications where states change over time.
This applies to the problem of a multi-stage attack that progresses over time to reach the goal of compromising a certain target. Even though the attacker sometimes may perform actions that are supposed to lead to lower security states from the current state for reasons depend on the type of attack, the left-right HMM does not allow transition to a lower state. Therefore, one of the proposed architectures is modeled using a modified HMM model where right-left transitions are allowed for a specific state as discussed in Section III-A.
2) The Number of HMM States: The selection of the optimum number of states for each HMM template is a challenge and there is no simple theoretical answer to how, in general, this parameter can be selected [33] . This parameter depends on the type of application. In this paper, we model the number of HMM states to be similar to the number of stages of the multi-stage attack. The justification is that the closer the number of states to the number of stages in the multi-stage attack, the better details can be provided about the progress of the attack and thus, it can lead to the development of more effective response mechanism.
3) HMM Model Training:
The most important part of the HMM database in the generic architecture of the detection system ( Fig. 1) is the parameterization of HMMs in terms of determining both A k and B k matrices in (1) to maximize probability P r(O|λ k ) for each multistage attack. There are several unsupervised training algorithms, such as Baum-Welch (BW) and Expectation Maximization (EM) [33] . In this paper, we use BW training algorithm as it is the most widely used algorithm and it is a special case of the EM method applied to HMM training [33] . Furthermore, since we have a limited availability of public datasets with multiple multistage attacks, we train HMMs with a small number of training data points, although practically the larger the number of training data points the better the model is, and thus the better detection accuracy can be obtained [29] .
B. Modeling Interleaved Attacks
We assume K distinct multi-stage attacks that are launched simultaneously in a network, and their related alerts, generated by IDS, are forwarded to the HMM database in a form of a stream of interleaved alerts. These alerts can be the result of a systematic interleaving of multiple multistage attacks initiated by a single attacker or can be generated randomly by different attackers.
Note, for each observation length (T ), we assume T alerts are processed by the HMM system.
In particular, at any time, it is possible that these T alerts can be from one attack or a mix of at most K attacks. Some possible interleaved attack scenarios that can be formed systematically or randomly are described as follows:
• An attacker starts and finishes an attack (Attack 1) in the middle of another ongoing attack (Attack 2).
• Multiple attacks start and finish at different times in the presence of one or multiple ongoing attacks.
• Stages of one attack can be embedded at different times across another ongoing attack(s).
• Stages of multiple attacks can be embedded at different times of an ongoing attack(s).
• Systematic interleaving among multiple multi-stage attacks based on interleaving groups of alerts.
Existing publicly available datasets, that have multi-stage attacks, do not consider these complex attack scenarios. The DARPA2000 alerts dataset, for instance, contains two distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) multi-stage attacks that happened at different times where the attacker uses multiple distributed compromised hosts to launch DoS attacks on a specific target [37] . To address the challenge of generating the aforementioned interleaved attack scenarios, we generate interleaved alerts by altering timestamps and IP addresses of the DARPA2000 dataset.
In order to detect the aforementioned attack scenarios, we propose two architectures based on the generic architecture shown in Fig. 1 . The design of the first architecture is based on modifying HMM model parameters to deal with the interleaved alerts. Since the same alert stream is processed by all the HMM templates in the database, Architecture I suffers from high false negatives when multi-stage attacks are highly interleaved, as discussed later in the paper.
Therefore, we propose a second architecture, Architecture II, to improve the detection capability by separating alerts from different attacks prior to routing alerts to HMM sub-system.
III. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURES
A. Proposed Architecture I
In order to deal with interleaved traffic alerts from different attacks, we modify HMM of the generic architecture in Fig. 1 (1)). This can be obtained by considering an observation o t , such that {o t / ∈ V k }. Accordingly, we add an extra column in the emission probability matrix, B k , to account for this new symbol, as follows:
Note, transition to State 1, in the presence of unrelated observation o t , occurs with probability 1 which has a very small value (such as < 1 × 10 −6 ) chosen such that M j=1 b 1j = 1. Accordingly, almost no change is made to the other observation probabilities in the first row of the emission probability matrix. In addition, setting the probability to zero in the rest of the last column increases the probability that observing {o t / ∈ V k } leads to State 1. A second modification is needed for the transition probability matrix (A k ) to ensure that whenever HMM k observes the T − L k alerts from attacks other than Attack k, transition to State 1 occurs. This can be done by introducing transition probability ( 2 ) in the first column of the A k matrix. Although our initial assumption is a left-right model, in this architecture, instead of adding a new state to the model we let all other states return only to State 1 whenever alerts from unrelated attacks occur. An important advantage of modeling unrelated alerts in this way is that it simplifies the training of each HMM. Subsequently, by introducing 2 , matrix A k becomes as follows:
Based on this modification and training of the HMM template (λ k ), the evaluation module determines whether Attack k is active or not, as shown in Fig. 2 , according to the criteria P r(O|λ k ) ≥ thr. Note, thr is a threshold used to avoid unnecessary computations of the Viterbi algorithm module in case the attack is not active. The thr value can be chosen in the range of 0 to 0.5. However, with the larger the value of thr, HMM template (λ k ) estimates only the states of the high probability sequences. In this paper, we take a conservative approach in choosing thr = 0. The evaluation probability can be computed using the forward algorithm [33] . In case Attack k is active, then HMM k (λ k ) runs the Viterbi algorithm to decode the most probable hidden states that correspond to the given observation sequence
follows:
where γ t (i) represents the probability of being in state s i at time t based on the observation sequence. In Architecture I, each HMM template in Fig. 2 uses the Viterbi algorithm to find the best state sequence, X = {x 1 , . . . , x t , . . . , x T }. For a given observation sequence, Viterbi algorithm finds the highest probability along a single path for every o t (t ≤ T ) and o t its corresponding state s i such that:
Using induction the algorithm determines the rest of the state sequence, as follows:
Stream of interleaved alerts This computation for the same given sequence is repeated by all other HMM templates in the Architecture I (Fig. 2) . Table I shows the overall processing of alerts based on Architecture I.
The limitation with Architecture I is that there is a high probability of high false negatives, especially when the attacks are highly interleaved. This is because each HMM template will most likely process an observation sequence that contains interfering observations belong to other attacks. More details about detection performance of Architecture I is given in Section IV.
To overcome this limitation, we propose another variation of the generic architecture of Fig. 1 .
The new architecture, termed as Architecture II, is depicted in Fig. 3 and is discussed below. 
While (O is not empty)
B. Proposed Architecture II
Again, we consider K interleaved multi-stage attacks that can be simultaneously launched in the network. The IDS system, based on SNORT, generates alerts from these attacks. Every alert is generated with a set of features, which includes alert ID, source/destination IP address, source/destination port number, and timestamp. In Architecture II, we use these features to improve detection efficiency of HMM templates. In particular, unrelated observations that do not belong to the k th attack are separated and passed to their respective HMMs. Note, the major design philosophy behind Architecture II is to use aforementioned features to preprocess the online network traffic stream and demultiplex it into multiple substreams, as shown in Fig. 3 .
We refer to this preprocessing step as a demultiplexing step. It is an important step as it helps in eliminating the number of interfering observations from other attacks that are not detectable by a particular HMM. Note, alerts triggered by the same attack scenario are correlated based on some features, (e.g., the source and destination IP addresses). We define alert (o i ) as a 7-tuple features (timestamp, ID, srcIP, srcPort, desIP, desPort, priority) according to the IDMEF [38] , [39] . We refer to this tuple as a feature set F = {f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , f 4 , f 5 , f 6 , f 7 }. The timestamp represents date and time of an alert generated by the IDS. ID is the identification of the alert, srcIP and srcPort indicate the source IP address and source port number, respectively. Also, desIP and desPort represent the destination IP address and port number, respectively, and priority indicates the alert's rank [10] .
A subset, S, from the feature set F (S ⊂ F ) can be used for demultiplexing operation. The simplest way in which we can demultiplex interleaved alerts is by grouping the alerts that are triggered by the same multi-stage attack into a one subsequence based on their IP addresses relationships, as illustrated in Fig. 4 , i.e., S = {f 3 , f 5 }. Note, IP addresses of the alerts, which are triggered by the same attack scenario, are generally related. Consider that there are two alerts, o i and o j . The demultiplexer searches for these addresses to check if they have the same srcIP, or the same desIP. Moreover, it also checks whether destIP of the previous alert is the same as the srcIP of the next one, as in a multi-stage attack scenario, the destination node of an earlier alert is the source node of the next alert. Based on the IP address search, the demultiplexer either inserts o i and o j in the same subsequence or in different ones.
The demultiplexer performs stream demultiplexing function into
The demultiplexing process is based on one or more aforementioned distinguishing feature(s) of the incoming alerts. Therefore, from the incoming stream of alerts, These substreams are a subset of O, which are represented as,
the larger the feature subset we consider in stream demultiplexing, the more distinct substreams we obtain and, in turn, the more processing is entailed. Note, within an observation sequence, alerts can belong to L attacks where 1 ≤ L ≤ K.
The demultiplexer module does not distinguish among types of attacks, therefore, it cannot route a substream to its corresponding HMM template. To address this issue in Architecture II, each HMM can have L instances, each of which can process one single substream. Thus, all the L generated substreams pass through each HMM to find which subsequence matches a certain HMM. The computation by each instance is performed based on the posterior probability given in (5) .
Note, this probability computation is performed L × K times. The next stage of the HMM process is to estimate state probabilities for its corresponding subsequence, O * k , found from (5) using the Viterbi decoding algorithm, as follows:
Unlike Architecture I, the first stage of every HMM in Architecture II has a maximum of K instances of the forward algorithm and one instance of the Viterbi algorithm. In addition, the 
HMM in Architecture II deals with subsequences of length T k , where T k ≤ T . Table II shows the overall processing of alerts based on Architecture II.
C. Complexity Comparison between Proposed Architectures
Note, in Architectures I and II in Figs. 2 and 3 , the main modules that contribute to the computational complexity are the alert preprocessing module for assigning alert severity, the stream demultiplexing module, and the HMM parallel branch modules. The first preprocessing module is the same for both architectures; however, the demultiplexing module exists only Therefore, M k = 12, k = 1, 2, as mentioned in Section II-A. The preprocessing module assigns a severity level to these alerts based on their relation to the stages of multi-stage attacks. In case there are more than one alert which lead to a state, the higher the severity level is given to the alert which indicates that the attack is progressing. Accordingly , Tables III and IV show alert severity, alert type and states of both attacks [26] . probabilities are based on the machine learning toolbox in MATLAB [40] . For the purpose of training, we use 30% of the dataset, while the rest of the dataset was used for testing. In this evaluation, parameters 1 and 2 of models λ 1 and λ 2 of Architecture I are chosen as 1 = 10
and 2 = 10 −3 .
For the completeness of our evaluation, we present the detection performance of the two multistage attacks using their respective HMMs when these attacks occur one at a time. Subsequently, several scenarios of the two simultaneous attacks are generated with a varying degree of interleaving to test the performance of the proposed architectures. For some cases, we compare the three architectures of Figs. 1, 2 , and 3. The reason for using the generic architecture of Fig. 1 for the comparison is that, no evaluation has been done in the literature for multiple multistage attacks.
For all the results, the x-axis shows the running count of alerts as they are generated by SNORT.
For the purpose of evaluation, we propose three performance metrics, in addition to the widely used state probability metric [26] . The proposed metrics are: (1) attack risk probability which provides an insight about the speed of attacks and can help in prioritizing response actions, (2) detection error rate performance, which measures how much error is generated by an architecture in estimating states, and (3) the number of correctly detected stages. The justification of these performance metrics is given in the following subsections.
A. Detection of Individual DARPA2000 Attacks
In this subsection, we first consider the alerts generated by SNORT when only LLDDOS 1.0 dataset is used. We pass these alerts to the alerts preprocessing module and then to HMM1 
B. Generating Alerts Interleaving Scenarios
Based on the two multi-stage attacks in the DARPA2000 dataset, we altered the timestamp of some of alerts in both attacks so that we can generate a single sequence of alerts that is composed of a mix of the two attacks without altering the temporal order of the original alerts.
In addition, the IP addresses of the hosts attacked by Attack 2 (LLDDOS 2.0.2) are also changed.
The reason for this modification is to simulate two simultaneous attacks intruding a network. 
C. Probability of State Estimation and the Effect of Interleaving
In this subsection, we present the state probability, γ t (i), from (2) and (6) respectively, as can be seen from Fig. 8 and Fig. 10 . The reason for this poor performance of Architecture I, is that as the degree of interleaving between alerts increases, the more interfering alerts can exist within a given sequence, causing the Viterbi algorithm to incorrectly determine the state probability of the non-interfering alerts. In summery, Figs. 8, 9, 10, and 11 show that there is no significant change in the state detection performance of each architecture as the observation length changes from 10 to 500 alerts. Moreover, Architecture II is more robust in terms of having better state probability estimation metric at a higher degree of interleaving as compared to Architecture I.
D. Attack Risk Probability
We define the first proposed performance metric as the attack risk probability, which is the probability of how far an attack is from compromising the target, i. e., reaching the final state. The calculation of this attack probability depends on the estimated state probability (γ t (i)) averaged over the total number of states. Its value gets updated at every observation length in a non-decreasing manner, as shown below in (7):
This performance measure can help in tracking the progress of each attack, especially when there are multiple organized attacks. It can be noted that, the rate at which the attack risk probability changes with respect to alerts gives an indication of how fast or slow an attack is progressing.
Consequently, this measure can help in prioritizing response actions for each ongoing attack.
Figs. 13 and 14 show the attack risk probability for both DARPA multi-stage attacks using Architecture I fails to detect some of the states for Scenarios 3 and 4, as illustrated in the previous subsection. Fig. 13c shows that both attacks progress at a slow pace. However, this
is not true as depicted in Fig. 14c where Architecture II shows both attacks progress fast at different paces. For instance, Attack 2 reaches 80% after 100 alerts, while Attack 1 reaches 80% after 300 alerts. Moreover, Fig. 13d shows that Attack 1 progresses faster than Attack 2, which is also not true, as depicted in Fig. 14d that indicates Attack 2 is faster than Attack 1. This inaccurate detection of these attacks can adversely affect response decisions, especially, when a priority-based response mechanism is employed [1] .
E. Error Rate Performance
The next performance measure we propose is the error rate (ER), which is the ratio of the number of errors due to the inconsistency between the type of an alert and the corresponding estimated state to the total number of incoming alerts. Formally, ER is given by the following (Fig. (1) ) for interleaving Scenarios 1,2, and 3. However, for Scenario 4, both Architecture I and generic architecture have similar ER, which is higher than Architecture II. It can also be noted that the ER for Architecture II remains almost constant with respect to T and is also the same for all scenarios. Similarly, Architecture I has almost constant ER with respect to T .
However, its ER performance gets worse as the degree of interleaving increases as compared to Architecture II. For instance, for Scenario 4, ER for Architecture I is as high as 77% as compared to Architecture II which has a value of 22%.
Note, for generic architecture, the ER generally increases with T and saturates to a value.
The main reason is the same as aforementioned reason (1) and the lack of capability of this architecture to distinguish between alerts from two different attacks. In addition, due to the same reason, its ER also increases from Scenario 1 through Scenario 4. We compare between architectures in terms of the number of detected stages per attack.
This measure is computed as follows. As we know the correspondence between alerts and stages (or states) of the attacks based on the knowledge of the DARPA2000 dataset, as shown in Tables III and IV, 
G. Extension to a higher number of attacks
The evaluation experiments in this paper were implemented with two simultaneous interleaved attacks because of the limited available datasets of multiple attacks. However, it can be observed that our proposed architectures can work easily with more than two simultaneous attacks. In particular, Architecture II can perform well since it depends essentially on the demultiplexing operation. With more than two attacks, we expect more computations, especially in the demultiplexing module and also in the HMM database component. Architecture I can also work well with more than two attacks, but its detection performance deteriorates significantly with a large number of attacks and a higher degree of interleaving.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper addresses the detection problem of interleaved multiple multi-stage attacks intruding a computer network. We propose two architectures based a well known machine learning technique, i. e. Hidden Markov Model, and provide their performance results and computational complexity. Both architectures can track interleaved attacks by obtaining the correct states of the system for each incoming alert. However, as the degree of interleaving among attacks increases, Architecture II, which employs a demultiplexing mechanism, exhibits better performance as compared to Architecture I. For performance assessment of these architectures, we propose three performance metrics which include (1) attack risk probability, (2) detection error rate, and (3) the number of correctly detected stages.
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APPENDIX A HMM PARAMETERS
The two HMMs are trained using 30% of the DARPA2000 dataset, i.e. HMM1 is using LLDDOS 1.0 and HMM2 is using LLDDOS 2.0.2 for training, while the rest of the dataset was used for testing. The main parameters of HMM model in both attacks are determined from training using the BW algorithm using MATLAB, and they are as follows: 
